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Our intuition tells us that there is a general trend in the evolution of nature, a
trend towards greater complexity. However, there are several definitions of com-
plexity and hence it is difficult to argue for or against the validity of this intuition.
Christoph Adami has recently introduced a novel measure called physical com-
plexity that assigns low complexity to both ordered and random systems and high
complexity to those in between. Physical complexity measures the amount of in-
formation that an organism stores in its genome about the environment in which
it evolves. The theory of physical complexity predicts that evolution increases
the amount of ‘knowledge’ an organism accumulates about its niche. It might be
fruitful to generalize Adami’s concept of complexity to the entire evolution (includ-
ing the evolution of man). Physical complexity fits nicely into the philosophical
framework of cognitive biology which considers biological evolution as a progressing
process of accumulation of knowledge (as a gradual increase of epistemic complex-
ity). According to this paradigm, evolution is a cognitive ‘ratchet’ that pushes
the organisms unidirectionally towards higher complexity. Dynamic environment
continually creates problems to be solved. To survive in the environment means to
solve the problem, and the solution is an embodied knowledge. Cognitive biology
(as well as the theory of physical complexity) uses the concepts of information
and entropy and views the evolution from both the information-theoretical and
thermodynamical perspective. Concerning humans as conscious beings, it seems
necessary to postulate an emergence of a new kind of knowledge - a self-aware and
self-referential knowledge. Appearence of selfreflection in evolution indicates that
the human brain reached a new qualitative level in the epistemic complexity.
1. Introduction
Our intuition suggests that there is a general trend in the evolution of na-
ture, a trend towards greater complexity. According to this view evolution
is a progressive process with Homo sapiens emerging at the top of the life’s
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hierarchy. An alternative opinion is that there is no trend in evolution and
we are just one of many leaves on the evolutionary tree. There are several
definitions of complexity and hence it is difficult to argue in a quantitative
way for or against the validity of each of these views. In my article, I will be
focusing on a novel measure of biological complexity (physical complexity)
that has been proposed by Christoph Adami.
2. Kolmogorov - Chaitin complexity and biology
One well-known definition of complexity is the Kolmogorov-Chaitin com-
plexity (introduced independently by Kolmogorov (1), Chaitin (2) and
Solomonoff (3)). It represents an algorithmic measure of system’s random-
ness (4, 5). It defines the complexity of an object (or a process) by the size
of the smallest program for calculating it. For example, a long sequence
of digits with a regular pattern (e.g. 01010101...) can be compressed to a
much shorter description/program (“repetition of 01”) and hence it has a
small amount of complexity. In contrast, an infinite random sequence of
digits “19255324193625168147...” has no intrinsic structure and cannot be
compressed at all. The only way to express the sequence is to enumerate all
the digits that it consists of. Thus, Kolmogorov - Chaitin’s definition im-
plies that maximum complexity is ascribed to a completely random process
that is algorithmically incompressible (Fig. 1, c.f. Ref. 6).
Figure 1.
However, although useful for the theory of computation, Kolmogorov-
Chaitin complexity does not satisfy our expectations inspired by biology
that most complex organisms are neither completely regular nor utterly
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random but lie between the two extremes of order and randomness (7).
What makes living systems complex is the interplay between order and
randomness (8). This principle has been supported by recent research on
biological networks (9). Complex networks of cellular biochemical path-
ways have neither regular nor random connectivity. They have a so called
scale-free structure (10). A scale-free network contains a small number of
hubs - major nodes with a very high number of links whereas most nodes in
the network have just a few links. “Scale-free” means that there is no well-
defined average number of connections to nodes of the network. In case of a
biochemical network, nodes and links represent molecules and their chemi-
cal reactions, respectively. In such a molecular network, hubs are important
molecules that participate in a large number of interactions (e.g. cAMP,
H2O) in comparison to other molecules that take part in a few biochemical
signaling paths (11). An important consequence of the scale-free archi-
tecture is robustness against accidental failures of minor nodes/links and
vulnerability to disfunctions of major hubs. (Note that this may bring inter-
esting insights into the molecular pathophysiology of various diseases.) Sur-
prisingly, recent mathematical analysis of various scale-free networks (in-
cluding biochemical signaling networks) has revealed self-similarity (fractal
pattern) in their structure (12). Self-similarity is a typical property of sys-
tems that are on the edge of order and chaos. Such a critical state (with
a tendency to phase transitions) might be useful for optimizing the per-
formance of the system (13). To sum up, we need a measure which would
capture the complexity of dynamical systems that operate between order
and randomness.
3. Physical complexity
Christoph Adami (14) has recently introduced a novel measure called physi-
cal complexity that assigns low complexity to both ordered and random sys-
tems and high complexity to those in between (Fig. 2). Physical complexity
measures the amount of information that an organism stores in its genome
about the environment in which it evolves. This information can be used
to make predictions about the environment. In technical terms, physical
complexity is a shared (mutual) Kolmogorov complexity between a sequence
and an environment (for mathematical equations see Ref. 14). Informa-
tion is not stored within a (genetic) sequence but rather in the correlations
between the sequence and what it describes. By contrast, Kolmogorov-
Chaitin complexity measures regularity/randomness within a sequence and
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therefore fails to address its meaning in the environment.a Information is
a relative quantity - always about something, in case of the genome it is
about the niche that an organism lives in (16, 17). The theory of physical
complexity uses two central concepts of Shannon’s theory of information:
entropy and information. Entropy is a measure of potential information,
it determines how much information a sequence could hold. Entropy of a
sequence can be compared to the length of a tape, and information to the
length of a tape portion containing recordings (14). Physical complexity has
the advantage that it is a practical measure, because entropy of an ensem-
ble of genetic sequences can be measured by estimating the probabilities of
finding the genetic sequences in the environment.
Figure 2.
Evolution is a slow process and therefore obtaining exact data is dif-
ficult. How could we test the hypothesis of the evolutionary complexity
increase? An interesting option is to study digital evolution (18). Digital
organisms (digitalia) are self-replicating computer programs (sequences of
instructions) that mutate and compete for space and computer time (19).
Thus, digital evolution occurs since the three conditions of evolution are
met: replication, variation (mutation) and competition/selection (due to
differential fitness/replication rate). Digital organisms have a much shorter
generation time (seconds) and their physical complexity can be measured
exactly. In this case, physical complexity is the information in a digitalia
aInterestingly, Chaitin has proposed his own definition of life based on Shannon’s concept
of mutual information. See Ref. 15.
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program that is vital to organism’s survival (replication). Of course, digital
evolution is a highly simplified model of biological evolution and this cre-
ates the possibility of artifact conclusions or generalizations. On the other
hand, simplification is at the same time the greatest strength of simulated
evolution experiments since it allows us to find and see the forest (general
principles of evolution), not just the trees.
Interestingly, Adami’s experiments on digital organisms revealed a
steady trend toward increased physical complexity in their evolution within
a fixed environment (16). According to his theory and simulation data, evo-
lution increases the amount of ‘knowledge’ an organism (or a population
of organisms) accumulates about its niche. Since in this context entropy
is a measure of potential information, biological evolution leads to a de-
crease of entropy. Natural selection turns an empty tape into a filled tape:
entropy into information. The information-filled part of the tape is impor-
tant for the survival of an organism in the environment. If the selective
advantage fixes a beneficial mutation within the population, the amount of
information (physical complexity) increases. Adami views natural selection
as a unidirectional filter (see below the discussion of ratchetting) that lets
information enter the genome, but prevents it from flowing out.
Adami’s simulations were done in a fixed environment. He discusses
that a rapidly changing environment as well as several other factors that
were not included in his experiments (high mutation rates, sexual recombi-
nation, co-evolution between species occupying different niches) may lead
to complexity declines. However, these factors are ambivalent - sometimes
they help, rather than hinder, the evolution of complexity (14). Therefore
he argues that there are good reasons to expect that the theory of phys-
ical complexity will reveal an overall trend towards higher complexity in
biological evolution.
4. Physical complexity and the concept of cognitive biology
It might be fruitful to generalize Adami’s concept of complexity (which
has been primarily thought to describe the evolution of genome) to the
entire evolution including the evolution of man (Fig. 3). Physical complex-
ity fits nicely into the philosophical framework of cognitive biology which
considers biological evolution as a progressing process of accumulation and
application of knowledge, i.e. as a gradual increase of epistemic complex-
ity (20, 21). Cognitive biology provides a broader philosophical frame for
Adami’s approach since the central idea of his theory of physical complexity
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is relating complexity to the system’s ‘knowledge’ (information) about its
environment. Physical complexity can be viewed as a special case of epis-
temic complexity. This becomes clear if we look at many common features
of Adami’s ideas and cognitive biological ideas. According to the paradigm
of cognitive biology, evolution as a whole is a cognitive ‘ratchet’ that pushes
the organisms unidirectionally towards higher complexity. Epistemic ‘ratch-
etting’ operates at all hierarchical levels, from molecules to societies (20).
Dynamic environment continually creates problems to be solved (i.e. each
niche is a solution problem). To survive in the environment means to solve
the problem, and the solution is an embodied knowledge.
Figure 3.
‘Ratchetting’ is a general phenomenon that has been usually described
in the context of thermodynamics. Cognitive biology acknowledges that
progress in evolution has thermodynamical reasons (20). Both cognitive
biology and the theory of physical complexity use the concepts of informa-
tion and entropy and strongly emphasize that there is a close connection be-
tween thermodynamical thinking and information-theoretical approaches.
By thermodynamical reasoning we can identify a ‘differentiation of a system
from environment’ as a dissipative ‘movement from thermodynamic equilib-
rium’ (22). Biological evolution creates organisms with an ever increasing
amount of embodied ‘knowledge’ and with an ever farther distance from
thermodynamical equilibrium (20). Living systems are far away from the
equilibrium because of the information stored in their genomes (17). John
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Polkinghorne (23) predicts that “by the end of the twenty first century,
information will have taken its place alongside energy as an indispensable
category for the understanding of nature.” The paradigm of cognitive bi-
ology points to the same direction.
5. Self-referential cognition - a ‘Big Bang’ of complexity in
cognitive evolution?
Concerning humans as conscious beings, it seems necessary to postulate
an emergence of a new kind of knowledge - a self-aware and self-referential
knowledge. We not only know, we know that we know. We not only
have informations but we possess informations about informations (meta-
informations) as well. Cognitive biology itself is an example of the self-
referential knowledge. It is a theory (knowledge) about accumulation of
knowledge. Appearence of selfreflection in evolution indicates that the hu-
man brain reached a new qualitative level in the epistemic complexity. One
may speak of a cognitive ‘Big Bang’. The expression of this cognitive ‘ex-
plosion’ that occured in human species may be found in the development of
science, art, culture and religion. Many writers have noticed this interest-
ing phenomenon. Gilbert Keith Chesterton wrote that “man is not merely
an evolution but rather a revolution.” Since the most primitive men drew
pictures and the most intelligent monkeys don’t, “art is the signature of
man” (24).
What are the mechanisms of self-awareness? Can we describe the emer-
gence of self-referential knowledge in the mathematical language of em-
pirical science? Is it possible to extend the theory of physical complexity
and formalize the meta-knowledge which is characteristic for our species?
Interestingly, Go¨del’s theorem shows a basic limitation of formal methods
due to self-reference (25). His results demonstrate that it is impossible
to achieve a complete knowledge of a (nontrivial) formal system with the
means available within the system. To fully understand the formal system
one must go outside the system (otherwise one falls into inconsistencies).
It is interesting to apply this principle to human cognition. According to
the computationalism, our mind basically functions as a certain (unknown)
computational algorithm. However, a Go¨delian line of thinking would sug-
gest that we are not able to find this out because we cannot step out of the
algorithm. If this reasoning is valid then there are two possibilities: either
we are no mechanical machines or we are machines but we cannot know
it because of the limitation imposed by computational selfreference. It is
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the limitation of an observer in “Cartesian prison” (26). In a paraphrase
of Stephen Hawking’s words (27): we don’t see the mind from the outside.
Instead, we and our models, are both part of the mind we are describing.
Thus, a theory of human cognition is self-referencing, like in Go¨del’s theo-
rem. One might therefore expect it to be either inconsistent, or incomplete.
So it seems to be improbable that a complete and consistent formalization
of human epistemic complexity is possible (28).
Based on Go¨delian and other arguments, some authors argue that the
evolutionary leap from ‘pure’ cognition to self-referential cognition might
have been governed by some novel noncomputational principles. (It should
be noted that Go¨delian arguments are highly controversial and the inter-
esting debate about their validity continues. See e.g. Ref. 29, 30, 31.) To
account for the emergence of consciousness, new physical principles (32)
or known physical (quantum) principles operating in the brain in a special
way have been suggested. An interesting quantum brain proposal was pub-
lished by Jeffrey Satinover (33) that combines findings in computational
neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics and quantum physics. Since indetermin-
ism observed in quantum events is sometimes interpreted as a fundamental
time asymmetry (34), it is tempting to speculate that if quantum brain
hypotheses contain some truth then a deeper link might connect thermody-
namic, cosmological and epistemic ‘ratchetting’ processes (for introduction
to quantum ‘ratchetting’ see e.g. Ref. 35).
If it is not possible to entirely reduce emergent human consciousness
to neuronal computation (28), then an interesting philosophical question
arises, namely what kind of emergence is responsible for it. Mark Bedau
distinguishes nominal, weak and strong emergence (36, see also Ref. 37). If
a new kind of causation powers (so called ‘downward causation’) has been
brought about by the emergence of selfreferent cognition, then we can call
it a strong emergence, according to Bedau’s definitions. The existence of
downward causation belongs to intensely discussed topics in the philosophy
of science. I a recent article, George Ellis (38) describes a hierarchical view
of the complexity of the universe with the autonomously effective mind at
the top of it: “the higher levels in the hierarchy of complexity have au-
tonomous causal powers that are functionally independent of lower-level
processes. Top-down causation takes place as well as bottom-up action,
with higher-level contexts determining the outcome of lower-level function-
ing...” These words resemble the Satinover’s hypothesis (33) of a hierarchy
of nested networks (similar to Hofstadter’s “tangled hierarchy”, Ref. 39).
An attractive speculation is that the strong emergence might be related to
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quantum phenomena since quantum theory postulates that quantum events
cannot be reduced to some form of bottom-level microscopic law governing
their outcomes (41, 40). In addition to information, the downward causa-
tion (or - in Aristotelian terms - the inside-out causation, Ref. 42) seems to
be a very interesting topic for discussion and research in complexity science
in the next years.
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